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CHIARELLA v. UNITED STATES
I. INTRODUCTION
The Securities Exchange Act of 1934' (the Act) is part of a com-
prehensive statutory scheme that was enacted to restore and promote
confidence in the financial markets of the United States after the stock
market crash of 1929.2 Section 10(b)3 of the Act and rule lOb-5
4
promulgated thereunder expressly prohibit the use of manipulative and
deceptive devices in connection with the purchase or sale of any secur-
ity. Courts have been consistent in finding violations of these antifraud
provisions where defendants have made material misrepresentations.
Moreover, in misrepresentation cases, the status of the person making
the disclosure is irrelevant.' Courts have not been consistent, however,
in finding violations of the antifraud provisions in cases where the de-
fendant failed to disclose material nonpublic information. Liability for
nondisclosure has turned on whether the nondisclosing party had a
duty to disclose. Determining whether there is a duty to disclose has
been a difficult and much litigated issue.6
The United States Supreme Court recently had occasion to decide
under what circumstances a duty to disclose would arise. In Chiarella v.
1. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk (1976).
2. Barnet, Neither a T#_per nor a Toppee Be, 8 Hous. L.'Rav. 278, 279 (1970).
3. Section 10(b) of the Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b), prohibits the use "in connection with the
purchase or sale of any security... [of] any manipulative or deceptive device or contri-
vance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as
necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors."
4. The SEC promulgated rule lob-5 pursuant to its rulemaking authority in § 10(b).
Rule lob-5 provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means
or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any
national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material
fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circum-
stances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(q) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or
sale of any security.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1980).
5. W. PAINTER, FEDERAL REGULATION OF INSIDER TRADING 137 (1968). Clause (b) of
rule lOb-5 expressly prohibits material misstatements. See supra note 4; Kardon v. National
Gypsum Co., 73 F. Supp. 798 (E.D. Pa. 1947).
6. E.g., Crane Co. v. Westinghouse Air Brake Co., 419 F.2d 787 (2d Cir. 1969), cert.
denied, 400 U.S. 822 (1970); Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 73 F. Supp. 798 (E.D. Pa.
1947).
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United States,7 the Court reviewed the criminal conviction8 of a pur-
chaser of stock9 under the antifraud provisions. Because the purchaser
was neither an insider nor a tippee, the conviction could not be af-
firmed based on settled legal principles. The Court reversed the con-
viction and rejected the parity of access to information theory'0 that
had been adopted by the Second Circuit.
The Chiarella Court also considered two other theories. The
Court concluded that a duty to disclose would arise from a relationship
akin to a fiduciary relationship. This theory evolved from common law
concepts of fraud. If that theory were to become the sole basis for rule
lOb-5 liability, however, it would represent an unwarranted substantive
7. 445 U.S. 222 (1980), rev'g 588 F.2d 1358 (2d Cir. 1978).
8. Chiarella arose in the context of a criminal action under the antifraud provisions of
the Act. Because the provisions have both criminal and civil implications, certain problems
of statutory construction are presented. It has been established that except for issues of
intent and burden of proof, criminal and civil liability under the Act are coextensive.
United States v. Charnay, 537 F.2d 341, 348 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1000 (1976);
United States v. Peltz, 433 F.2d 48, 53 (2d Cir. 1970). Also, it has been held that the statute
in civil cases should be flexibly construed to achieve the most protection for securities inves-
tors. Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128 (1972); A.T. Brod & Co. v. Per-
low, 375 F.2d 393 (2d Cir. 1967); SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, 375 U.S. 180
(1963). In United States v. Persky, 520 F.2d 283 (2d Cir. 1975), Judge Kaufman noted the
inherent conflict that arises in interpretation of civil and criminal statutes. "Perhaps the
most interesting [issue] is the apparent dissonance between the general rule that criminal
statutes are to be strictly construed in favor of the accused. . . and the realization that the
civil incarnations of the anti-fraud provisions have, as remedial legislation, been openly and
avowedly construed broadly." Id. at 287.
While it is uncertain from the Chiarella opinion how much of an effect the fact that this
was a criminal action had on the Court's decision, the Court did note a concern about liberal
interpretations of the statute. The Court pointed out that "a judicial holding that certain
undefined activities 'generally are prohibited' by § 10(b) would raise questions whether
either criminal or civil defendants would be given fair notice that they have engaged in
illegal activity." 445 U.S. at 235 n.20. The Court, however, took no further notice that this
was a criminal action, and it is likely that the opinion will have an equal impact on civil
cases.
9. The Court found it worth noting that Chiarella was the first case in which criminal
liability had been imposed upon a purchaser for § 10(b) nondisclosure. 445 U.S. at 235 n.20.
Although Chiarella was a purchaser of stock, it is apparent that the Court's opinion would
be the same were he a seller. The Court referred, without comment, to the reasoning em-
ployed in Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961), that the insider assumes a fiduciary
relation to the buyer by the very sale. Id. at 914 n.23 (citing Grativ. Claughton, 187 F.2d
46, 49 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 920 (1951)).
10. The parity of access theory is discussed infra notes 54-68 and accompanying text.
The Supreme Court's decision dealt only with nondisclosure cases. It did not deal with cases
in which representations are made. The part of the indictment based on clause (b) of rule
lOb-5, see supra note 4, was dismissed at trial since "the petitioner made no statements at all
in connection with the purchase of stock." 445 U.S. at 225 n.5.
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restriction of the antifraud provisions which were intended to be broad
and remedial.
The Court also considered a misappropriation theory11 under
which a duty to disclose would arise if a party to a securities transaction
wrongfully obtained material nonpublic information. This theory, ex-
pressly endorsed by four Justices,12 is consistent with the policies and
purposes underlying the Act and should be adopted as an additional
test for nondisclosure liability.
II. FACTS OF THE CASE
Vincent Chiarella was employed by Pandick Press, a financial
printer, from 1975 to 1976. In his capacity as a "markup man,"
Chiarella had access to many confidential documents, including docu-
ments pertaining to prospective tender offers. When such documents
were submitted to Chiarella, the vital information concerning the iden-
tities of the bidding and target corporations was either omitted or en-
coded" to insure confidentiality until the information was publicly
disclosed.
Chiarella was a knowledgeable stock trader. 4 Based upon his
own knowledge of the stock market and the information contained in
the documents he set for printing, Chiarella was able to deduce the
names of the corporations involved in five impending takeover bids.15
Disregarding notices posted throughout the print shop that use of cus-
tomer information for personal gain was illegal and against company
rules, Chiarella purchased stock in each of the target companies. As
each takeover bid was made public, Chiarella sold his shares, eventu-
11. See infra notes 81-88 and accompanying text.
12. The theory of misappropriation was advocated by the Chief Justice in his dissent,
445 U.S. at 239 (Burger, C.3., dissenting); see infra notes 81-88 and accompanying text. Jus-
tice Blackmun, joined by Justice Marshall in dissent, agreed with the theory but would have
also endorsed an even more liberal construction of the antifraud provisions. 445 U.S. at 246
(Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan, in his concurrence, would have held misappro-
priation as the proper theory, but concurred in the judgment on the basis that the theory was
not properly presented to the jury. Id. at 239 (Brennan, J., concurring).
13. United States v. Chiarella, 588 F.2d 1358, 1363 (2d Cir. 1978), rev'd, 445 U.S. 222
(1980). For example, one of the transactions involved a tender offer of USM Corporation
stock by Emhart Corporation. The documents submitted to the printer identified "U.S.C.
Corp." and "Arabia Corp." as the principals.
14. Chiarella had more than a passing interest in securities markets, as evidenced by his
conversations with his broker as many as ten to fifteen times a day. 588 F.2d at 1363.
15. Four of the transactions involved tender offers and the other involved a merger. The
parties stipulated that the form of the takeover was not significant. Id. at 1363 n.2. Addi-
tionally, the parties stipulated that the information regarding the takeovers was material.
Id. at 1364 n.5.
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ally netting over $30,000 in profits in fifteen months. 6
In 1977, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) began an
investigation into Chiarella's activities. On May 24, 1977, Chiarella en-
tered into a consent decree with the SEC in which he agreed to disgorge
his profits for eventual distribution to the sellers of the target stock.' 7
On the same day, he was discharged from Pandick Press.
In January 1978, Chiarella was indicted"8 on seventeen counts of
criminal violations of section 10(b) and SEC rule lOb-5 19 and was later
convicted by a jury on each count.20 Chiarella appealed21 his convic-
tion and contended that because he was neither an insider, nor owed
any fiduciary duty to selling shareholders of the target companies, he
was not subject to a duty to disclose.
A divided Second Circuit affirmed the conviction, holding that a
duty to disclose arises from regular access to market information.
22
The court concluded that it was irrelevant that Chiarella was not an
insider of the target companies because "[a] financial printer such as
Chiarella is as inside the market itself as one could be."'23 Noting that a
major purpose of the antifraud provisions is to protect the integrity of
the marketplace, the Second Circuit imposed an affirmative duty of dis-
closure on the market insider2l4 and held Chiarella's silence to be a vio-
lation of rule lOb-5.5  The Supreme Court granted certiorari26 and
reversed Chiarella's conviction.
16. Id. at 1363.
17. Id. at 1364.
18. The action was brought under § 32(a) of the Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(a), which provides
for criminal sanctions against a person who wilfully violates any provision of the Act or of
any rule thereunder, the violation of which is made unlawful. While the Supreme Court did
not address the issue, the appellate court found that Chiarella had the requisite scienter.
United States v. Chiarella, 588 F.2d- at 1369-73.
19. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. at 225 n.3. Chiarella was indicted one count for
each letter he received confirming purchase of the shares.
20. Chiarella was sentenced to one year imprisonment. After one month, his sentence
was suspended and he was placed on probation for five years. 588 F.2d at 1364 n.7.
21. The district court, in United States v. Chiarella, 450 F. Supp. 95 (S.D.N.Y. 1978),
denied a motion to dismiss on the grounds that Chiarella was guilty of fraud as to the sellers
of the target stock and as to the offering companies.
22. 588 F.2d at 1368. The court derived its test from the concept of "quasi-insiders"
discussed in ALI FED. SEC. CODE § 1602. The quasi-insider is one who has regular access to
market information and would be liable under § 10(b) only in egregious cases. 588 F.2d at
1365.
23. Id at 1364.
24. Id. at 1365.
25. Id. at 1367-69.
26. 441 U.S. 942 (1979).
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III. THE SUPREME COURT'S DECISION
A. Development of Nondisclosure Liability
In reaching its decision, the Chiarella Court briefly discussed the
development of the duty to disclose. Early common law actions for
fraud and deceit could only be based on outright misrepresentations.27
Later, fraud actions were allowed in cases of nondisclosure provided a
duty to disclose existed. That duty, however, was only imposed where
there existed a fiduciary relationship or some other relationship of trust
and confidence between the parties to the transaction.28 Under the ma-
jority rule that developed at common law, a corporate insider only
owed a duty of disclosure to his corporation. Therefore, in stock trans-
actions with shareholders, the insider could deal at arm's length with
no disclosure obligation.2 9 Moreover, there was no requirement that
insiders disclose information when trading occurred on a stock
exchange.30
The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 was designed to insure full
disclosure of information to the investing public.31 One of the primary
27. 3 L. Loss, SEcuRrrIEs REGULATION 1433-34 (2d ed. 1961) [hereinafter L. Loss].
The common law elements of deceit are:
1. A false representation of a material fact made by the defendant.
2. Knowledge on the part of the defendant that the statement is false.
3. Reliance on the part of the plaintiff.
4. Damage to the plaintiff resulting from his reliance.
W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 685-86 (4th ed. 1971).
28. Jennings, Insider Trading in Corporate Securities: A Survey of Hazards and Disclo-
sure Obligations under Rule 10b-5, 62 Nw. U. L. REv. 809, 810 (1968) [hereinafter cited as
Jennings].
29. Goodwin v. Agassiz, 283 Mass. 358, 186 N.E. 659 (1933); FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA
OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 1168.1, at 283 (perm. ed. rev. 1975) [hereinafter
cited as FLETCHER].
The "Kansas Rule," adopted by a minority of the states, considered insiders as trustees
for individual shareholders and included nondisclosure as grounds for an action in deceit.
Stewart v. Harris, 69 Kan. 498, 77 P. 277 (1904); Oliver v. Oliver, 118 Ga. 362, 45 S.E. 232
(1903). This rule went to the extreme of holding that an insider could not purchase stock
from a stockholder without giving him the benefit of any official knowledge he possessed
regarding the value of the stock. FLETCHER, supra § 1168.2, at 288. The special facts doc-
trine, first enunciated in Strong v. Repide, 213 U.S. 419 (1909), imposed a limited duty on
insiders to disclose the value of shares when dealing with a shareholder, even without a
fiduciary relationship, if "special facts" existed. Id. at 431. See also Janigan v. Taylor, 344
F.2d 781 (1st Cir. 1965). Special knowledge was information which a shareholder could not
find in the company books or financial reports. Conant, Duties of Disclosure of Corporate
Insiders Who Purchase Shares, 46 CORNELL L.Q. 53, 59 (1960). However, both the minority
rule and the special facts doctrine dealt only with face-to-face transactions. Jennings, supra
note 28, at 811-12.
30. A. JACOBS, THE IMPACT OF lOb-5 § 66.02(a) (rev. ed. 1980).
31. See SEC v. National Sec., Inc., 393 U.S. 453, 466 (1968); Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch,
1981]
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purposes of the broad antifraud provisions of the Act was to outlaw the
use of inside information by corporate insiders to the detriment of the
uninformed public securities holders.32 Section 10(b) was designed as a
catchall provision to prevent fraudulent practices in the purchase and
sale of securities. That section and rule 10b-5 are broader in scope than
traditional common law fraud actions and were designed to reach mis-
leading or deceptive activities whether or not they are technically suffi-
cient to sustain a common law action.
3 3
Rule l0b-5 expressly prohibits any person, insider or not, from
telling a material lie or half-truth in connection with the purchase or
sale of any security.34 The rule does not expressly state, however,
whether nondisclosure is actionable.
The SEC took an important step in nondisclosure liability in Cady,
Roberts & Co. 35 In that case, the SEC determined that a broker who
received nonpublic information from a director of a corporation was
under an affirmative obligation to disclose material information. Cady,
Roberts involved a partner in a brokerage firm who, immediately after
the corporation had decided to cut its dividend rate and before the in-
formation was publicly disclosed, sold Curtiss-Wright stock. 6 The
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d 228, 235 (2d Cir. 1974); Crane Co. v. Westinghouse
Air Brake Co., 419 F.2d 787, 793 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 822 (1970).
32. In an early rule lOb-5 case, Judge Leahy explained the scope and purpose of the
rule:
The duty of disclosure stems from the necessity of preventing a corporate insider
from utilizing his position to take unfair advantage of the uninformed minority
stockholders. It is an attempt to provide some degree of equalization of bargaining
position in order that the minority may exercise an informed judgment in any such
transaction.... One of the primary purposes of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934... was to outlaw the use of inside information by corporate officers and
principal stockholders for their own financial advantage to the detriment of unin-
formed public security holders.
Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 99 F. Supp. 808, 829 (D. Del. 1951), aft'd, 235 F.2d 369 (3d
Cir. 1956).
33. Herpich v. Wallace, 430 F.2d 792, 802 (5th Cir. 1970); List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340
F.2d 457, 462 (2d Cir. 1965).
34. See Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 73 F. Supp. 798, 801 n. I (E.D. Pa. 1947); supra
note 4. Thus, a person with no fiduciary duty'or relationship to the company is in violation
of rule lOb-5 if he makes a material misrepresentation in connection with the purchase or
sale of securities*. Fleischer, Securities Trading and Corporate Information Practices: The
Implications of the Texas Gui/Sulphur Proceeding, 51 VA. L. REv. 1271, 1277 (1965). A
more difficult issue is presented, however, when nondisclosure constitutes the fraud.
Fleischer, An Initial Inquiry Into the Responsibility to Disclose Market Information, 121 U.
PA. L. REv. 798, 803 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Fleischer].
35. 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961).
36. Id. at 908-09. In early November, 1959, Gintel, the partner, purchased almost
11,000 shares of Curtiss-Wright stock for customers' discretionary accounts. Id. at 908. Fol-
lowing the public disclosure of a new type of engine, the stock increased in price. Id. Gintel
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partner had received this information from an associate who was also a
director of Curtiss-Wright. The Commissioner held that the partner
owed a duty to disclose this information and recognized two policies
underlying the imposition of the duty:
[F]irst, the existence of a relationship giving access, directly or
indirectly, to information intended to be available only for a
corporate purpose and not for the personal benefit of anyone,
and second, the inherent unfairness involved where a party
takes advantage of such information knowing it is unavailable
to those with whom he is dealing. . . . Thus our task here is
to identify those persons who are in a special relationship with
a company and privy to its internal affairs, and thereby suffer
correlative duties in trading in its securities."
Thus, Cady, Roberts was important to the development of nondisclo-
sure liability in two respects. First, nondisclosure became actionable
without requiring the plaintiff to prove the common law elements of
fraud.38 Second, and more importantly, the decision expanded the
group which owed a duty to disclose beyond corporate officers, direc-
tors, and controlling shareholders. The obligations of an insider were
imposed on the broker because of a special relationship giving him ac-
cess to inside information.39
Based in part on the reasoning and test developed in Cady, Rob-
ers, the Second Circuit, in SEC v. Texas Wulf Sulphur,40 suggested that
immediately began selling Curtiss-Wright stock. These sales were prior to the company's
decisions to lower its dividend. Id. Upon hearing of the intended cut in the dividend,
Gintel executed more sell orders. Id. at 909. Gintel's contention that these latter sales were
part of his prior plan to liquidate was rejected by the SEC because they occurred far more
quickly than the earlier sales, which occurred before he learned the information. Id. at 916.
37. Id. at 912 (footnote omitted).
38. Cady, Roberts was important in that it construed actions under the rule to be
broader than at common law. At common law, actions for fraud or deceit were based on
express misrepresentations of a material fact. L. Loss, supra note 27, at 1432. At common
law, no action would lie for a seller of securities because there would have been no fiduciary
duty existing between the seller and the buyer. Id. at 1434-35. Cady, Roberts, however,
interpreted rule lOb-5 to include situations broader than the common law and imposed the
same duty of disclosure on a corporate insider when selling stock as when purchasing securi-
ties. The Commissioner noted that "[t]here is no valid reason why persons whopurchase
stock from an officer, director or other person having the responsibilities of an 'insider'
should not have the same protection afforded by disclosure of special information as persons
who sell stock to them." 40 S.E.C. at 913 (emphasis in original).
39. 40 S.E.C. at 912. The Commissioner did not explain the nature of the special rela-
tionship. However, the test has been used to impose liability on persons who are not corpo-
rate officers, directors, or majority shareholders. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d 833,
848-55 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
40. 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
1981]
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the reach of the statute in nondisclosure cases might be expanded even
further. In Texas ruf Sulphur, certain directors and corporate employ-
ees purchased stock in their corporation without disclosing nonpublic
information regarding important mineral discoveries, which, if known,
would have had an impact on the price of the shares.4' In holding the
directors and employees liable under section 10(b), the court did not
base liability on any special insider relationship.42 It noted that the
relationship discussed in Cady, Roberts was not a stringent test, but that
the statute was intended to preclude anyone who had inside informa-
tion from trading, unless he first disclosed that information. The court
stated that:
Insiders, as directors or management officers are, of course, by
this Rule precluded from so unfairly dealing, but the Rule is
also applicable to one possessing the information who may
not be strictly termed an "insider" within the meaning of sec-
tion 16(b) of the [Exchange] Act. . . . Thus, anyone in pos-
session of material inside information must either disclose it
to the investing public, or, if he is disabled from disclosing it
in order to protect a corporate confidence, or he chooses not
to do so, must abstain from trading in or recommending the
securities concerned while such inside information remains
undisclosed.43
While the Texas G6f Sulphur decision suggested that all trading on
inside information was prohibited, the Second Circuit in General Time
Corp. v. Talley Industries," held that rule lOb-5 does not place an af-
firmative duty on a corporation making stock purchases to disclose its
intention to make a tender offer at a higher price.
The Second Circuit, in Texas Guff Sulphur, reserved opinion as to
41. Id. at 843-48. Texas Gulf Sulphur was a corporation engaged in the mining of cer-
tain minerals. The company discovered what appeared to be a very promising source of
zinc, copper and silver. Id. Before the importance of the find was disclosed, certain corpo-
rate employees purchased stock in the corporation. Id. at 843-44.
42. See id at 848.
43. Id. (dictum). Although Texas Gulf Sulphur went beyond Cady, Roberts, all of the
defendants were, in fact, corporate insiders or employees. Id. at 845.
44. 403 F.2d 159 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1026 (1969).
45. Although plans for the merger would increase the value of stock, the court stated:
"We know of no rule of law, applicable at the time, that a purchaser of stock, who was not
an "insider" and had no fiduciary relation to a prospective seller, had any obligation to
reveal circumstances that might raise a seller's demands and thus abort the sale." .d. at 164.
General Time was decided before the enactment of the Williams Act. Section 13(d)(1)
of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(1) (1976), permits persons making tender offers to
purchase up to five percent of the target company securities without disclosing their
intentions.
ol. 5
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liability of tippees in nondisclosure cases.46 The issue finally was de-
cided by the Second Circuit in Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner
&Smith, .Inc.47 The Shapiro court extended the abstain or disclose rule
to tippees of corporate insiders because they have the duty not to profit
from the use of inside information which they know is confidential and
know or should know came from a corporate insider.48
The United States Supreme Court added a new dimension to the
duty to disclose inAffiliated Ute Citizens v. United States,49 where 10b-5
liability was imposed on a bank and its agents who were neither corpo-
rate insiders nor tippees. The bank agreed to act as a transfer agent for
a group of Indian shareholders in the Ute Distribution Corporation.
There were two markets for the stock: one involving sales of stock
from Indians to non-Indians through the bank, and another involving a
resale market consisting of non-Indians only. The Indians were una-
ware of the existence of the second market where stock prices were
significantly higher than in the primary market. The Affiliated Ute
Court found that the bank and its agents were liable and observed that
the agents had been active in encouraging a market for the shares and
that the Indians had a right to know about the existence of the second
market.5
Noting the development of nondisclosure liability and using Affili-
ated Ute as precedent, the Second Circuit, in United States v. Chiarel-
la,5" formulated a new test for i0b-5 liability. The court stated that
"[a]nyone-corporate insider or not-who regularly receives material
nonpublic information may not use that information to trade in securi-
ties without incurring an affirmative duty to disclose."52 Essentially,
46. 401 F.2d at 852-53. There was evidence that one of the insiders had tipped the
information regarding mineral discoveries to outsiders, but the court withheld judgment as
to the liability of these tippees because they were not defendants in the subject proceeding.
Id.
47. 495 F.2d 228 (2d Cir. 1974).
48. The tippee was held to be liable under rule lOb-5 if he knew or should have known
that the information came from a corporate insider and that the information was nonpublic.
Id. at 238. Thus, the relationship aspect is found in the tipper's position, and the tippee
need only know the information came from an inside source. See In re Investors Manage-
ment Co., [1970-1971 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 78,163 (July 29, 1971).
49. 406 U.S. 128 (1972).
50. Id. at 151-53. While it appears that the case held that use of market information
may be a violation of the rule, there was, in fact;a relationship element in that the bank was
active in encouraging the Indians to sell, and had undertaken to act on behalf of the Indian
shareholders. Id. at 152. See Fleischer, supra note 34, at 819-20.
51. 588 F.2d 1358 (2d Cir. 1978), rev'd, 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
52. Id. at 1365 (emphasis in original).
1981]
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the Second Circuit adopted a parity of access to information theory.53
B. Parity of A4ccess to Information
The Supreme Court reversed Chiarella's conviction 54 because it
concluded that neither section 10(b) itself, nor its legislative history,
lent support to the theory that all traders have equal access to informa-
tion before trading in securities. 5 It expressly rejected parity of access
to information as a theory for liability under section 10(b) or rule lOb-
5. 56 This theory is based on a policy of protection of the integrity of the
fiaarketplace by insuring that all investors in securities are dealing with
the same set of facts.5 7 Prior to the Second Circuit's opinion in Chiarel-
la, no case had held parity to be the rule, but the theory had received
support in other opinions. 53 Indeed, the duty of disclosure imposed on
corporate insiders had as its foundation the unfairness of allowing a
corporate insider to take advantage of an uninformed minority share-
holder.59 Additionally, the concept of fairness was recognized by the
Commissioner in Cady, Roberts, a case on which the Court relied in
establishing the relationship prerequisite.60
Parity of access to information did receive support from two dis-
senting justices. In dissent, Justice Blackmun, joined by Justice Mar-
shall, supported the parity of access to information rule. Justice
Blackmun would have held that "persons having access to confidential
material information that is not legally available to others generally are
prohibited by Rule lOb-5 from engaging in schemes to exploit their
structural informational advantage through trading in affected securi-
ties.' 61 He noted that "Congress itself has recognized [that] it is inte-
gral to this purpose 'to assure that dealing in securities is fair and
without undue preferences or advantages among investors.' "62 Both
53. See infra notes 54-68 and accompanying text.
54. 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
55. Id. at 233-34.
56. Id. at 232. The Court found two defects in this approach: (1) not every instance of
financial unfairness constitutes fraudulent activity under section 10(b) (citing Santa Fe In-
dus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 474-75 (1977)) and (2) the element required to make si-
lence fraudulent-a duty to disclose-is absent. 445 U.S. at 232.
57. Fleiseher, supra note 34, at 816.
58. See, e.g., SEC v. Great Am. Indus., Inc., 407 F.2d 453, 463-64 (2d Cir. 1968) (Hays,
J., concurring).
59. Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 99 F. Supp. 808, 829 (D. Del. 1951).
60. 40 S.E.C. at 911. This is the second aspect of the Commissioner's test, "the inherent
unfairness involved." Id. at 912.
61. 445 U.S. at 251 (Blackmun, 3., dissenting).
62. Id. at 248 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting H.R. RIP. No. 229, 94th Cong., Ist
Sess. 91, reprintedin 1975 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS, 321).
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Justice Blackmun's dissent and the Second Circuit opinion supporting
application of the parity rule pointed to Affiliated Ute as authority for
the proposition that strategic position in the market place gives rise to
an affirmative duty to disclose.63 Indeed, the Supreme Court in Affili-
ated Ute noted that "by repeated use of the word, 'any,' [the statute and
rule] are obviously meant to be inclusive."'
The majority, however, refused to give such a broad interpretation
to either the statute or to Affiliated Ute. The Court stated that
"[f]ormulation of such a broad duty, which departs radically from the
established doctrine that duty arises from a specific relationship be-
tween two parties. . should not be undertaken absent some explicit
evidence of congressional intent. . . . [N]either the Congress nor the
Commission ever has adopted a parity-of-information rule.
' 65
The Supreme Court's reversal on this ground is not a surprising
result. The Second Circuit's test of "regular access to market informa-
tion" was an incomplete one. The Second Circuit conceded that
would-be tender offerors may purchase up to five percent of the target's
stock without making any disclosure.6 6 If equalization of access to in-
formation were the underlying theory of rule 10b-5, then certainly,
tender offerors would come within the ambit of the rule. Furthermore,
adoption of such a theory would mean that mere possession of inside
information would be sufficient to trigger liability, yet the courts have
adhered to the Cady, Roberts analysis which requires some relationship
before liability will be imposed.67 Parity of access to information
would represent a significant departure from established 10b-5
doctrine.
68
C. The Common Law Approach
While rejecting the Second Circuit's parity of access to informa-
63. 445 U.S. at 251 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun, who wrote the major-
ity opinion inAffiliated Ute, noted with displeasure the narrow interpretation that the major-
ity seemed to be giving the case. "As I now read my opinion there for the Court, it lends
strong support to the principle that a structural disparity in access to material information is
a critical factor under Rule lOb-5 in establishing a duty either to disclose the information or
to abstain from trading." Id.
64. 406 U.S. at 151.
65. 445 U.S. at 233.
66. 588 F.2d at 1366. This is permitted by § 13(d)(1) of the Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(1)
(1976). See supra note 45. Additionally, the Second Circuit did not overrule its decision in
General Time Corp. v. Talley Indus., 403 F.2d 159 (2d Cii. 1968), cert denied, 393 U.S. 1026
(1969).
67. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
68. Fleischer, supra note 34, at 816.
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tion theory, the Court discussed under what circumstances liability
would attach under section 10(b) and rule lOb-5. The Court discussed
the development of nondisclosure cases and focused its attention on the
underlying common law nature of the relationships involved in earlier
cases. It explained that the relationships in Cady, Roberts and in com-
mon law cases imposing liability on corporate insiders vis-a-vis their
shareholders were premised on the use of confidential information ob-
tained "by reason of their position with that corporation. ' 69 The Court
cited Texas 6Wuf Sulphur for the proposition that corporate insiders
may not trade on the basis of undisclosed information 0 but did not
address the Second Circuit's broad language in that opinion. The
Court also explained that its approach in Affiliated Vte was not as
broad as it may have appeared. Rather, the Chiarella Court noted that
the Affiliated Vte case was consistent with common law theories of
duty, pointing to dictum in Affiliated Ute that if the "bank had func-
tioned merely as a transfer agent, there would have been no duty of
disclosure."'"
Many previous cases had stated that section 10(b) was designed to
begin where common law concepts of fraud ended72 and had gradually
expanded the reach of the statute. However, the Court in Chiarella
suggested that it would curtail such expansion in nondisclosure cases
and would reestablish ties with the common law notions of relation-
ship. It warned that section 10(b) is "aptly described as a catchall pro-
vision, but what it catches must be fraud. '7 3 Consistent with its
concern for the common law, the Court formulated a rather stringent
test for outsider liability in nondisclosure cases. Mere silence in con-
nection with the purchase or sale of securities is insufficient to establish
liability absent the existence of some independent, affirmative duty to
disclose.74 The Court concluded that such a duty arises where there is a
relationship of "trust and confidence between [thel parties to [the]
transaction .75
In applying this test to the facts of the case, the Court noted that
no duty to disclose could have arisen from Chiarella's relationship with
69. 445 U.S. at 228.
70. Id. at 229 (citing Texas Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394
U.S. 976 (1969)).
71. 406 U.S. at 152,
72. Id. at 151; Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 12 (1971);
A.T. Brod & Co. v. Perlow, 375 F.2d 393, 397 (2d Cir. 1967).
73. 445 U.S. at 234-35.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 230 (emphasis added).
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the sellers of target stock. He had had no prior dealings with them and
was a complete stranger who dealt with the sellers only through imper-
sonal transactions. The Court found it important that "he was not a
person in whom the sellers had placed their trust and confidence." 6
Thus, the Court distinguished Chiarella from a corporate insider who
has a duty to disclose. The Court also recognized that "tippees" have
been held liable under section 10(b) "because they have a duty not to
profit from the use of inside information that they know is confidential
and know or should know came from a corporate insider.""7 Under
this rationale, the tippee is liable as a participant after the fact in the
insider's breach of his fiduciary duty. Chiarella was not a tippee, how-
ever, because he had received no confidential information from the tar-
get companies whose stock he traded. If he had, presumably, his
conviction would have been atfirmed.
Under a strict reading of the majority opinion, therefore, in non-
disclosure cases, noninsiders would not be held liable under section
10(b) or rule 10b-5 unless the noninsider undertook to act on behalf of
the shareholders.78 The problem, however, is that the majority opinion
was premised on a theory of a breach of a duty by Chiarefla to target
shareholders. Under this theory, and absent the Court's adoption of a
parity of access to information theory,79 no liability could have arisen
from Chiarella's activities. There existed no relationship between
Chiarella and target shareholders. The Court, however, has left it un-
clear as to just how strictly the opinion is to be read. The Court posed
one theory on which liability may be based, but in side-stepping an
alternative theory--that of misappropriation'°--the Court left open the
possibility of the statute's application under another theory in future
cases with a Chiarella-type fact pattern.
. Misappropriation
The majority opinion referred to, but did not decide, the possibil-
ity of the application of a new theory of liability under rule 10b-5 based
76. Id. at 232. This is premised on the fact that Chiarella gleaned his information from
documents he received from the acquiring companies and the stock he purchased was from
the target corporations. Id. at 231.
77. Id It is interesting to note that the Court simply noted the fact that tippees have
been held liable, but voiced no opinion as to whether the Court approved or disapproved of
tippee liability.
78. If the defendant had undertaken to act on behalf of the shareholders, presumably,
the Court's present reading of the Affiliated Utle test would be met.
79. See supra notes 54-68 and accompanying text.
80. See infra notes 81-88 and accompanying text.
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-on misappropriation. The theory argued by the Government and ad-
vocated by Chief Justice Burger in his dissent"' was that Chiarella
breached a duty to the acquiring corporation when he acted on confi-
dential information he obtained by virtue of his position with the
financial printer. The breach of this duty of confidentiality, according
to the theory presented, supported a conviction under section 10(b) for
fraud perpetrated upon both the acquiring companies and the sellers of
target stock.82 The Chief Justice would have read the antifraud provi-
sions to "encompass and build on this principle: to mean that a person
who has misappropriated nonpublic information has an absolute duty
to disclose that information or to refrain from trading. ' 83 Justice Bren-
nan, in a concurring opinion,84 also supported such a position, stating
that "a person violates § 10(b) whenever he improperly obtains or con-
verts to his own benefit nonpublic information which he then uses in
connection with the purchase or sale of securities.""5 The majority,
however, refused to decide the issue of misappropriation. It simply
noted that the jury instructions did not present the issue to the jury and
that therefore a decision on the theory would be inappropriate.
8 6
The theory of misappropriation is narrower than the parity of ac-
cess to information theory. The misappropriation theory begins with
the general rule that neither party to an arm's length transaction has an
obligation to disclose information to the other unless the parties stand
in some confidential or fiduciary relation. Thus, a businessman may
capitalize on his experience and skill in evaluating relevant informa-
tion. The rule does not preclude any individual with material nonpub-
lic information from trading so long as the information was obtained
legally and not unlawfully converted for his or her own use. For in-
stance, tender offerors would not come within the ambit of the theory
since that information would be legally obtained and used for a legiti-
mate corporate purpose.
The rule comes into play, according to the Chief Justice's dissent,
"when an informational advantage is obtained not by superior experi-
81. 445 U.S. at 239 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
82. Id. at 235.
83. Id. at 240 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
84. Id. at 238 (Brennan, J., concurring).
85. Id. at 239 (Brennan, J., concurring).,
86. "[We do not believe that a 'misappropriation' theory was included in the jury in-
structions." Id. at 237 n.21. "Because we cannot affirm a criminal conviction on the basis of
a theory not presented to the jury. . we will not speculate upon whether such a duty exists,
whether it has been breached, or whether such albreach constitutes a violation of § 10(b)."
Id. at 236-37 (citations omitted).
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ence, foresight, or industry, but by some unlawful means."87 Under
these circumstances, the person who has misappropriated information
has an affirmative duty of disclosure before trading in the securities.
According to this theory, because he "stole" valuable corporate infor-
mation given to him in confidence and then used that information for
his own personal advantage, Chiarella violated section 10(b) and rule
lOb-5.
Whether misappropriation encompasses the type of activity that
the statute was intended to reach is uncertain both from the language of
the statute and from the Court's opinion in Chiarella. The position
taken by the majority does not foreclose the possibility that, given ap-
propriate jury instructions, the Court would uphold a conviction or find
civil liability based on that theory. The majority opinion was not in-
consistent with the misappropriation theory.88 If it were inconsistent,
the Court certainly would have rejected the theory.
There are, however, some unanswered questions posed by the mis-
appropriation theory, particularly on the issue of damages. If the un-
derlying duty to disclose is premised upon a confidential relationship to
the acquiring companies and the breach of a duty of confidentiality
operates as a fraud upon those companies, then, arguably, those com-
panies who are neither purchasers nor sellers of the stock would have
no damages. Hence, there would be no actionable violation.89 If this
were the case and the Court were to adopt the misappropriation theory,
a situation could arise wherein a person could be subject to criminal
prosecution under rule lOb-5 and yet not be liable for damages in a
civil action. If, on the other hand, the Court were to find that an action
for damages would lie, it is uncertain what the measure of those dam-
ages would be.
Regardless of the difficulties posed by the adoption of the misap-
propriation theory, the theory does seem to be consistent with the prin-
ciple that "the broad language of the antifraud provisions" should not
be "circumscribed by fine distinctions and rigid classifications" such as
those that prevailed at common law.90 The use of rule lOb-5 in these
87. Id. at 240 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
88. The Chief Justice stated his "understanding that the Court has not rejected the view
...that an absolute duty to disclose or refrain arises from the very act of misappropriating
nonpublic information." Id. at 243 n.4 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
89. See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975).
90. Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. at 912. This position was also endorsed by Commis-
sioner. Smith in his concurring opinion in In re Investors Management Co., [1970-1971
Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) % 78,163 (July 29, 1971). The Commissioner
stated: "A duty not to steal or knowingly receive stolen goods or exercise dominion over
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The Chiarella Court has left open the future of rule lOb-5. It is
certain from the opinion that parity of information is not the proper
basis for imposition of liability under the antifraud provisions of the
Act. What is not clear is how strict the Court will be in future cases as
to the requirement of a relationship between the parties to the stock
transaction. The Court has carefully formulated a test for liability
based on common law notions of relationships, but has reserved opin-
ion as to misappropriation as a triggering device.
To adopt the trust and confidence doctrine as the sole basis for
liability under the antifraud provisions would unduly restrict those pro-
visions, and create an unnecessary distinction between inside informa-
tion and market information.92 Such an approach would minimize
"the importance of. ..access to confidential information that the
honest investor, no matter how diligently he tried, could not legally
obtain."93
Adoption of the misappropriation theory as an additional theory
for lOb-5 liability, however, would be consistent with the underlying
purposes of section 10(b) 94 and would retain some of ihe elasticity with
goods known to be owned by others exists toward the corporation even without the presence
of a special relationship." Id. at 80,524 n.2.
91. See Painter, Inside Information: Growing Painsfor the Development of Federal Cor-
poration Law Under Rule 10b-5, 65 COLUM. L. REv. 1361, 1393 (1965).
92. "Market information refers to information about events or circumstances which af-
fect the market for a company's securities but which do not affect the company's assets or
earning power." Fleischer, supra note 34, at 799. Market information is frequently outside
information generated by sources outside the company whose shares are affected. Id. at 807.
93. 445 U.S. at 247 (Blackmun, I., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
94. "As Congress itself has recognized, it is integral to this purpose 'to assure that deal-
ing in securities is fair and without undue preferences or advantages among investors.'" Id.
at 248 (Blackmun, 3., dissenting) (quoting H.R. CONF. REP. No. 94-229, at 91 (1975)). Re-
cently, the SEC enacted rule 14e-3, 45 Fed. Reg. 60,410, 60,418 (1980) (to be codified in 17
C.F.R. § 240.14e-3), an antifraud provision establishing a "disclose or abstain rule" for any
person who is in possession of material information he or she knows or has reason to know
is nonpublic and was acquired, directly or indirectly, from that person 'or the issuer of the
securities subject to tender offer. The rule also establishes an anti-tipping rule with respect
to nonpublic information relating to a tender offer, which proscribes conduct such as
Chiarella's. However, the new rule is not applicable to merger situations so that another
Chlarella-type situation could arise under lOb-5.
The Commission has stated its belief, however, that misappropriation comes within the
ambit of section 10(b). "The Commission continues to believe that [misappropriation] un-
dermines the integrity of, and investor confidence in, the securities market, and that persons
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which the broad statute was drafted. The theory also falls within the
Cady, Roberts analysis. It would require a relationship giving access to
nonpublic information and would only be triggered when the informa-
tion so obtained was not used for a legitimate corporate purpose. Thus,
the adoption of the misappropriation theory would allow corporations
to make required disclosures under the Act without fear that that infor-
mation would be exploited before it was made public.
Kerry Cunningham Feffer
who unlawfully obtain or misappropriate material, nonpublic information violate rule lOb-5
when they trade on such information." Id. at 60,412.
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